

leaders honestly hope to overthrow us. They are gambling we believe on the prospect of an early peace. But if by any chance the submarine should succeed, the party of von Tirpitz would be invincible. We cannot therefore take any chances of allowing the campaign to succeed. It must be made to fail in two ways: by demonstrating that the sea can be kept open, and by enlisting our strength on the side of the Allies. That would be a German failure indeed because it would be clear then that the assault on the West had merely doubled the power of the West.

These, we believe, are the main causes why we are being drawn into the war, the main reasons why we should enter it, and the main objects we should pursue. There could be no greater error than that voiced by Senator Borah when he said, "It ought to be distinctly understood that we are interested alone in protecting our neutral rights as a neutral nation, and that what we have done and all that we may do is for that purpose and no other." A few moments reflection will show that the issue never has been one of neutral rights, that to fight for them alone would be to isolate ourselves from our natural Allies and leave us exposed after the war, and finally that no form of action can be devised which will vindicate all neutral rights, or even those which Germany alone has violated. If we put the matter on the basis of neutral rights we shall never know whether we have vindicated them or not, and our participation in the war would be as futile as a duel of honor.

What we must fight for is the common interest of the western world, for the integrity of the Atlantic Powers. We must recognize that we are in fact one great community and act as a member of it. Our entrance into it would weight it immeasurably in favor of liberalism, and make the organization of a league for peace an immediately practical object of statesmanship. By showing that we are ready now, as well as in the theoretical future, to defend the western world, the cornerstone of federation would be laid. We would not and could not fight to exclude Germany from that league. We would not and could not fight for a bad settlement. The real danger to a decent peace has always been that the western nations would become so dependent on Russia and Japan that they must pay any price for their loyalty. That danger is almost certainly obviated by our participation. For when the peace conference begins some time toward the end of 1917, as it most certainly will, the final arbitrament between liberalism and reaction will be made by the relative power of each. If the liberal forces have the most strength left it is they who will decide the reorganization of the world.

## Lincoln in 1917

EARLY in November, 1864, immediately after his reelection, President Lincoln made a brief speech upon the results of the election which compares in substance, if not in form, with the Gettysburg address and the Second Inaugural. In a few pregnant phrases he sketched what the peculiar dangers were which are bound to beset a democracy when engaged in a serious war. "It has long been a grave question," he said, "whether any government not too strong for the liberties of its people can be strong enough to maintain its own existence in great emergencies." He considered that the recent election had for the time being demonstrated the ability of the American people to sustain a strong government without any sacrifice of liberty. But he knew that on every future emergency a test no less dangerous and exigent would have to be faced. "What has occurred in this case," he said, "must ever recur in similar cases. Human nature will not change. In any future great national trial, compared with the men of this, we shall have as weak and as strong, as silly and as wise, as bad and as good. Let us therefore study the incidents of this as philosophy to learn wisdom from, and none of them as wrongs to be revenged."

Again the American people are confronted by a grave national emergency. In our moment of searching trial we cannot do better than to follow his advice and study the incidents both of the Civil War and the existing crisis as philosophy to learn wisdom from. It is the more desirable to follow this advice, because during the past two years the issues and incidents of our Civil War, and the personal relation of Mr. Lincoln to them, have been wilfully and grotesquely misinterpreted. Partisans have found chapter and verse in the Lincoln record and scripture for every phase of pacifist irresponsibility and of militarist obsession. The smoke and heat thrown off by the conflagration have obscured the clear and congruous outlines of Mr. Lincoln's own attitude and philosophy. Let us see whether we cannot resurrect something of the real meaning and of the real man.

We should remember, in the first place, that Mr. Lincoln insisted upon fighting to resist the secession of the South from the Union. Although one of the most humane men in the world, who was the despair of his generals because he would not give his personal consent to the execution of deserters, yet he did not flinch from a decision which involved his fellow countrymen in the prolonged calamity of one of the most desperate and destructive of wars. His refusal to yield did not



look as inevitable in the fall of 1860 as it does to-day. Then as now the nation was enervated by uncertainty and distracted by conflicting counsels. Abolitionists like Garrison wanted to avoid war at any cost and to allow the erring sisters to depart in peace. Republican leaders like Seward were willing to enter into arrangements with the southern leaders which would perpetuate the house divided against itself and reduce the nation to a hyphenated alliance between slave and free states. But Lincoln would have nothing to do with Crittenden compromises. The Republican party had been organized to prevent the spread of slavery within the Union. He had been elected expressly for the purpose of carrying this policy into effect. He refused absolutely to place himself and his party in the situation of solemnly proclaiming a policy and then of accepting a measure of conciliation which dishonored all its promises and renounced all its objects. He would avoid war if possible; he would do nothing to provoke it; but he would not seek to avoid it by abandoning one inch of the ground assumed by the Republican party as the consequence of almost forty years of southern aggression. It was a moment when difficulties, fears and scruples could not be permitted to interfere with an ultimate decision, when the morale of a great people depended upon resolute and imperturbable fulfilment of declared purposes in action.

Yet although he would not flinch from fighting he had something in him which prevented him from being infected by the psychology of war. War is repugnant to a democracy, not merely because it is wasteful, barbarous and hideous, but because the state of mind of a nation at war suppresses or discourages the application of ideas to business and politics upon which the democratic fulfilment depends. It is the perfect example of that dangerous, costly, headstrong and imperative action which seems to demand, as the condition of its success, the utter subordination of the variety and humor of life to a grim puritanism of immediate achievement. It insists on the undivided service of the material, emotional, intellectual and moral resources of a people. A nation at war is intolerant of dissent or contradiction, of hesitation or patience, of any tendency to mitigate emotion with reflection or supplement action with open-minded research. Lincoln never yielded to this constraint. Because he insisted on fighting rather than compromising, and because he would not abandon the fight until the purposes for which it was begun were achieved, he has been credited with the hypnotism of emotion and the absolutism of dogma so characteristic of European statesmen of to-day. But Mr. Lincoln's absolutes were al-

ways under control and were always tempered by kindness of feeling and by an inquisitive openness of mind.

When he advised his fellow countrymen to study the incidents of the war, not as wrongs to be revenged but as philosophy to learn wisdom from, he was preaching precisely what he practised. His speeches will be searched in vain for a single sentence which attacked the Southerners with harsh, bitter, or intemperate words. He not only felt kindly towards them, but in thinking about them he was scrupulously considerate and fair. Because they had by their own aggressive acts brought this war on and because they were fighting for the perpetuity of legalized human bondage, he was not tempted either to outlaw them or condemn them to punishment. He foresaw the futility of drawing up an indictment against a people with the intention of making them suffer for their transgressions. His behavior in this respect was superior to that of many of his contemporaries, not only because of his essentially humane imagination but because his intellectual grip upon the political issues of the Civil War was far more comprehensive, exact and profound than theirs. In those days, as in these, there were people who believed that because one side was more right than the other, the war had no object except to make the right prevail. By subordinating political to moral considerations, they oversimplified the problem and so increased the difficulty of its solution. Mr. Lincoln was, consequently, sharply criticized for vacillation and hesitation, for allowing his policy to be dictated by expediency and for his refusal to cut all political knots with the sword of a moral imperative. But he knew better than his critics. They were condemning him for his most salutary quality. He was only seeking to grasp the situation as a whole, to keep all of its complicated aspects in his mind at the same time, and to arrange them in the order of their relative importance. Surrounded as he was by the passions and obsessions of a desperate war, he never budged from his ordinary practice of patiently waiting until he possessed all the available facts and then of applying to them the searchlight of cool, disinterested and purposed thinking.

His peculiar greatness did not consist merely in his kindness and magnanimity of feeling, or in his ultimate stability of purpose, or in his penetrating, surefooted and indefatigable intelligence. It consisted in the extraordinary fact of a successful working combination of all these qualities in one man. He achieved for himself a mutually helpful relation among lively human sympathies, a firm will and a luminous intelligence. He used his in-



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telligence to enlighten his will, and his will to establish the mature decision of his intelligence. His formal judgments were charged with momentum and his actions with sympathy and understanding. Because of this many-sidedness and balance he answered the question in his own life which in the post-election speech he had put to the American people. In the case of an individual, as in the case of a nation, it is always doubtful whether an authoritative government not too strong for the liberties of its members can be strong enough to maintain its existence in great emergencies. The government of Mr. Lincoln's mind was strong enough to maintain its own integrity during the great test, but at the same time it left the liberty of his other members not only intact but vigorous and operative. In the present emergency, no American citizen can by his own efforts secure to his country a salutary combination of government and liberty, of resolution and enlightenment; but all of us can at least do something, however imperfectly, to create some such combination in our own lives and to welcome any evidence of it in others. Inasmuch as the American nation has inherited the priceless possession of a national hero who succeeded in keeping alive during a war the finest spiritual flowers of a democratic society, a prevailing indifference to his advice and example during the present national emergency would be as shabby a piece of backsliding as could be committed by a pretentiously patriotic people.

## A Policy in Vocational Education

**N**OW that the passage of the Smith-Hughes bill is assured, interest moves to the distribution of this federal subsidy for vocational continuation and part-time schools. For the actual sums appropriated, even the maximum which will be available in nine years, are too small to be of constructive significance. Indeed there is something grotesque about the solemn and arduous study which went into the passage of this timid educational bill by a Congress which could appropriate a full third of a billion for armaments. The Smith-Hughes bill has all the aspect of a pious wish rather than the beginning of a thorough national policy in education. There was nothing revolutionary in this principle of federal aid. The principle was established by the Morrill act of 1862 and recently confirmed by the Smith-Lever bill for agricultural education. The halting character of this new legislation must be explained partly by the novelty of vocational training in

America and by the extremely confused condition of mind about it.

We scarcely know yet how to institute a vocational education that will make out of our youth effective workers and at the same time free and initiating citizens. The hopeless lack of co-ordination between industry and our educational system blocks and bewilders our efforts. In working towards a solution we meet two very real perils. When we attempt a co-ordination we run the risk of turning the public school into a mere preparatory school for factory, store and workshop, turning out helpless workers riveted by their very training to a rigid and arbitrary industrial life. The better trained they are, or at least the more intense their specialization, the greater will be their subjection. Organized labor fears, and not unjustly, that a public vocational education might be the means of overcrowding the labor market and thereby "furnishing strike-breakers to industry." This is always the danger when we attempt to adjust our training too tightly to existing industrial conditions. On the other hand, if we try to evade this danger and make the young worker's training more general, so that a number of fields of industrial opportunity will be open to him, we may leave him more helpless than ever, for he has no assurance of being fit for the very concrete demands of skill that paying industry will make upon him.

This is the dilemma. If the organization of vocational training is left in charge of the representatives of the employers, educators fear, and fear rightly, that the first result will ensue. If it is left exclusively in the hands of educators, the employers fear the other danger. Vocational education in this country has, therefore, run its uncertain course through experiments in continuation schools, "pre-vocational" courses in the regular schools, trade courses, "coöperative" courses, until a certain scepticism has been aroused in the minds of professional educators and the interested public whether we can institute a workable system at all in our present public school. Scepticism has meant hesitation. In spite of the propaganda and survey work of an influential society of educators, employers and labor men—the National Society for the Promotion of Industrial Education—progress has been very slow. Only eight states have provided for the encouragement of vocational education and in only one is continuation schooling compulsory. The whole movement has needed some very definite concentrated stimulus and some new, clear focusing of the issues.

This is the real value of the new federal bill. If it is negligible in its actual power for aid, its indirect effects should be of great importance in